USCA4 Appeal: 25-1892
Doc: 16
Filed: 10/15/2025
Pg: 55 of 97
to use its reasoned judgment to weigh the relevant considerations and
determine how best to prioritize between these objectives ,” and therefore intends to bar states from “ re-balancing ” those considerations. Farina v. Nokia Inc. , 625 F.3d 97, 123 (3d Cir. 2010); see Nazarian , 753 F.3d at 479
(federal law prevented Maryland from “substituting the state’s preferred
incentive structure for that approved by FERC”). States certainly may not
“criminalize actions” that Congress has left to the “discretion” of federal officials, as Maryland has attempted here. United States v. South Carolina , 720 F.3d 518, 530 (4th Cir. 2013). II. T HE D ISTRICT C OURT E RRED I N R EJECTING P REEMPTION . In rejecting the overwhelming evidence of preemption, the district
court began by presuming that Kalshi’s sports -event contracts are gambling,
then worked backwards, invoking various policy rationales to read an
extratextual gambling exception into the CEA ’s text. The statutory text and
structure refute the court’s grounds for rejecting preemption. If affirmed,
the district court’s conclusion that states may freely apply their gambling
laws to trading on DCMs would amount to an unprecedented intrusion into
the CFTC’s exclusive jurisdiction.
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