USCA4 Appeal: 25-1892
Doc: 16
Filed: 10/15/2025
Pg: 59 of 97
Congress in 1974 just as unquestionably intended to preempt such gambling
laws when it granted the CFTC “exclusive jurisdiction” to regulate trading on
those exchanges. It is inconceivable that, despite having “field -preemptive
intent” in 1974, JA159, Congress silently intended to allow states to apply
their gambling laws to DCMs. And it is equally inconceivable that Congress
in Dodd-Frank intended to allow states to ban trading on DCMs as gambling
even though, four years earlier, Congress in UIGEA provided that state
gambling laws “ do[] not include ” “any transac tion conducted on or subject
to the rules of a [DCM] under the [CEA].” 31 U.S.C. § 5362(1)(E).
The district court’s conclusion that states may enforce their gambling
laws against DCMs would have radical repercussions. Many states define gambling sufficiently broadly to permit regulation of any financial position on an uncertain outcome. See N.J. Rev. Stat. § 2C:37-1(b) (defining
gambling as “staking or risking something of value upon … a future
contingent event”); N.Y. Penal L. § 225.00(2) (same); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 463.0193 (regulating all entities “accepting wagers on sporting events or other events ” ) (emphasis added). If, as the district court maintained, states remain free to apply their gambling laws even to DCMs, states would be free to regulate all event contracts, or even all futures contracts — which, after all,
can readily be characterized as staking something of value on a future
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