USCA4 Appeal: 25-1892
Doc: 16
Filed: 10/15/2025
Pg: 64 of 97
that the Special Rule sought to “ restore CFTC’s authority to prevent trading
that is contrary to the public interest.” 156 Cong. Rec. S5902, S5906 (July
15, 2010) (emphasis added). As Senator Lincoln and other architects of
Dodd-Frank noted to the Third Circuit, Congress “ intended event contracts
on designated contract markets to be regulated by the CFTC, and the CFTC alone. ” Members of Congress Br. 5, KalshiEX LLC v. Flaherty , No. 25-1922 (3d Cir.). Second , the district court held that the savings clause in Section 2(a)
“ cuts against a finding of field preemption. ” JA167. But the savings clause
unambiguously supports preemption. It provides that the CEA does not
supersede other regulators’ jurisdiction “[e]xcept as hereinabove provided”
by the grant of exclusive jurisdiction to the CFTC. 7 U.S.C. § 2(a)(1)(A).
Congress included that proviso specifically to ensure the savings clause would not limit the preemptive effect of Section 2(a) ’s grant of exclusive jurisdiction to the CFTC. See S. Rep. No. 93-1131, at 23. Quoting International Paper v. Ouellette , 479 U.S. 481, 492 (1987), the
district court maintained that the savings clause ’s existence “negates the
inference that Congress left no room for state causes of action.” JA167
(quotation omitted). But it is undisputed that the savings clause leaves room for state causes of action for off-DCM transactions. See CFTC v. Am. Metals
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