USCA4 Appeal: 25-1892
Doc: 16
Filed: 10/15/2025
Pg: 74 of 97
analysis. State law must yield to inconsistent federal law no matter how “clearly within a State’s acknowledged power” the state’s law resides. Free ,
369 U.S. at 666. Notwithstanding the district court’s views of the importance
of ensuring uniform regulation of derivatives markets, Congress’s intent to bring DCMs “under a uniform set of regulations” is what governs. Am. Agric. , 977 F.2d at 1156.
Apart from downplaying the importance of the CFTC’s exclusive
jurisdiction over DCMs, the district court did not dispute that allowing 50
different states to ban contracts on DCMs would nullify Congress’s decision
to entrust the CFTC with discretion to determine whether these contracts are “contrary to the public interest.” 7 U.S.C. § 7a-2(c)(5)(C); see Hughes , 578
U.S. at 165 (state law preempted where it would “ second-guess ” decision of
agency with exclusive jurisdiction). That is another, independent basis to
find preemption. D.
The District Court Erred In Applying A Presumption Against Preemption. The district court relied heavily on a “presumption against
preemption” and therefore required Kalshi to show that Congress’s “‘ clear
and manifest purpose ’” in amending the CEA in 1974 and 2010 was to
preempt state gambling laws. JA157-158 (quotation omitted). As explained
above, Kalshi has made that showing, and this Court need not decide
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