USCA4 Appeal: 25-1892
Doc: 16
Filed: 10/15/2025
Pg: 76 of 97
§ 2(a)(1)(A); see Transcon. Gas , 108 F.4th at 151-152 (an “ explicit statutory
conferral of exclusive jurisdiction ... is a form of express preemption ”). The
Court’s role is to interpret that statutory text without applying a presumption
that would override the “best evidence of Congress’ pre - emptive intent.” Franklin , 579 U.S. at 125. Second, setting aside the express-preemption clause, no presumption applies “when the State regulates in an area where there has been a history of significant federal presence.” United States v. Locke , 529 U.S. 89, 108 (2000). Here, the “federal government has been vitally concerned with [derivatives] trading” for over a century. Leist , 638 F.2d at 322. While the district court observed that states have traditionally regulated gambling, JA158-159, states have not traditionally used their gambling laws to regulate
trading on DCMs —at least not since the CEA’s enactment in 1936.
The Supreme Court has declined to apply a presumption where, as
here, state law has not traditionally applied to the specific field at issue. In Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs’ Legal Committee , 531 U.S. 341, 347-348 (2001),
for example, the Supreme Court declined to apply a presumption in
concluding that a federal statute preempted a state common-law fraud claim.
Although providing redress to victims of fraud is a traditional state function, the theory of fraud in Buckman was “fraud -on-the-FDA, ” and “[p] olicing
61
Made with FlippingBook - Online catalogs