Case 2:25-cv-00978-APG-BNW Document 42 Filed 08/04/25 Page 12 of 26
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authority of the [CEA] (and the regulations issued by the [CFTC]) would preempt the field insofar as futures regulation is concerned .” S. Rep. No. 93-1194, at 35 (1974) (Conf. Rep.) (emphasis added). See also Kalshi v. Hendrick I , 2025 WL 1073495, at *6 (“[L]egislative history supports the conclusion that Congress intended to occupy the field and preempt state law from applying to CFTC-designated exchanges.”). The drafting history of the 1974 amendments eliminates any doubt of Congress’s purpose. At that time, Congress deleted a provision that preserved state authority over derivatives trading on DCMs. See Kevin T. Van Wart, Preemption and the Commodity Exchange Act , 58 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 657, 687–88 (1982); see also 120 Cong. Rec. 30,464 (Sept. 9, 1974) (statements of Sens. Curtis and Talmadge). The Senate made this deletion, clarifying “the [CFTC’s] jurisdiction, where applicable[,] supersedes State as well as Federal agencies.” S. Rep. No. 93-1131, at 5848 (1974). “Few principles of statutory construction are more compelling than the proposition that Congress does not intend sub silentio to enact statutory language that it has earlier discarded in favor of other language.” I.N.S. v. Cardoza-Fonseca , 480 U.S. 421, 442–43 (1987). The Senate also added the “except as hereinabove provided” language to the state-law savings clause of the exclusive jurisdiction provision, clarifying that the savings clause does not apply to derivatives transactions on DCMs. S. Rep. No. 93-1131, at 5870 (1974). The Senate’s deletion of the provision for concurrent state jurisdiction and limitation of the state-law savings clause are unmistakable indications of Congress’s intent to preempt state regulation that would interfere with the CFTC’s exclusive jurisdiction. Comprehensive Regulatory Scheme. The CEA’s comprehensive regulatory framework, including its enforcement provisions, confirms Congress’s intent to occupy the field exclusively. The CEA establishes “a comprehensive regulatory structure to oversee the volatile and esoteric futures trading complex.” Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran , 456 U.S. 353, 356 (1982) (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 93-975, at 1 (1974)). Congress establishes such comprehensive structures when it means to leave “no room for the states to supplement federal law.” Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. F.C.C. , 476 U.S. 355, 368–69 (1986); see also Arizona , 567 U.S. at 401 (explaining that a federal scheme’s “comprehensive” nature supports field preemption). An
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