Case 2:25-cv-00978-APG-BNW Document 75 Filed 09/15/25 Page 15 of 20
Circuit examined whether a broadly applicable statute regulating railways (the Interstate
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Commerce Commission Termination Act (“ICCTA”)) repealed portions of an earlier statute that
was specific to Indian tribes (the Indian Right of Way Act (“IRWA”)). There, a railroad operator
was violating an easement issued under IRWA. The railroad operator argued that the ICCTA
repealed certain provisions of IRWA. The Ninth Circuit noted that “[i]n the context of a statute
that touches on federal Indian law, such as [IRWA], there is an additional canon of construction:
[S]tatutes are to be construed liberally in favor of the Indians, with ambiguous provisions
interpreted to their benefit.” Id . at 1156 (citation omitted).
Applying that canon, the Ninth Circuit held that the ICCTA did not repeal the earlier IRWA
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on several grounds. First, it found that IRWA expressly applied to railroads, and that Congress did
not mention or reference rights-of-way on Indian lands when it enacted the ICCTA. Second, it
found that IRWA applied to a very specific circumstance—rights-of-way on Indian lands—
whereas the ICCTA applied to railroad regulations broadly. In the absence of clear intention by
Congress, the Court held that “a specific statute will not be controlled or nullified by a general one,
regardless of the priority of enactment.” Id . at 1160 (quoting Mancari , 417 U.S. at 550–51).
The Ninth Circuit has therefore established a clear standard by which courts should
evaluate whether a broad statute repeals or amends an earlier Indian statute by implication: they
must construe ambiguity liberally in favor of the Indians, and should not infer congressional intent
to repeal an earlier, more specific statute governing activities on Indian lands without a clear
statement from Congress.
Applying this principle to the CEA, there is no language suggesting that Congress intended
to repeal IGRA’s regulation of sports betting on Indian lands, let alone “clear and manifest” intent
to repeal these key provisions of IGRA. At most, the definition of “swaps” upon which
Crypto.com relies is ambiguous as to whether it encompasses sports event contracts of the kind
offered by Crypto.com—i.e., sports betting. Ambiguity is not “clear and manifest” intent, and an
ambiguous statutory provision cannot overcome the strong presumption against repeals by
implication. It also implicates the Indian canon of statutory construction that requires the
ambiguous definition of “swaps” to be interpreted in favor of tribes to maintain IGRA and all its
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