Case: 25-1922 Document: 73 Page: 19 Date Filed: 08/14/2025
court and Kalshi seem to recognize that this allows private individuals to bring state-law claims in state court. See JA13; Appellee Br. 56–57. But neither can explain why private individuals are free to pursue such claims while the State is preempted from doing the same. That nonexpla- nation is understandable: if the Act prevented States from bringing state- court actions, then it would “supersede or limit the jurisdiction” of state courts, in direct contravention of the savings clause. 7 U.S.C. § 2(a)(1)(A). A final piece of statutory evidence points the same way: not only did Congress repeatedly accommodate state law and include savings clauses, it incorporated state law into the special rule governing these event con- tracts. See id. § 7a-2(c)(5)(C)(i)(I). Kalshi misses the point (at 57) by quib- bling with the scope of the special rule’s categories. Regardless of their scope, the special rule’s reference to “gaming”—an area long regulated by States—and “activity that is unlawful under” state law, confirms that Congress did not intend to preempt generally applicable state laws merely because they touch a market that might also be regulated by the CFTC. See Appellants’ Br. 34–37. As one court recently determined, the “fact that Congress expressly authorized the” CFTC “to prohibit particular categories of transactions as contrary to the public interest based on the fact that the conduct at issue would violate state law severely undercuts Kalshi’s suggestion that Congress intended to displace all state laws that would otherwise apply to transactions that fall within the scope of the [Act].” Martin , 2025 WL
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