Case: 25-1922 Document: 73 Page: 21 Date Filed: 08/14/2025
federal agency and a state counterpart both using state law (as in RICO prosecutions, Williams v. Stone , 109 F.3d 890, 895 (3d Cir. 1997)) or fed- eral law dictating when States can use their laws for certain federal pur- poses (as in determining Medicaid eligibility, Lewis v. Alexander , 685 F.3d 325, 344 (3d Cir. 2012)) and here—with a federal agency becoming the only entity that can interpret and apply state law. Given Congress’s incorporation of state law into the special rule and its uniform acceptance of state gambling law generally, there is no reason to think Congress in- tended that anomalous and extreme result. 8 Combined, the text and structure of federal law indicate Congress’s plain intent to account for—not to foreclose—state legislation. B. New Jersey’s Sports Wagering Act Is Not Barred By Ex- press, Field, Or Conflict Preemption. Even examined individually, none of the three preemption catego- ries indicate that the Act supersedes New Jersey’s law. 8 Nothing in the amicus brief by former members of Congress is to the contrary. No “individual Member of Congress can pre-empt a State’s judgment by merely musing about goals or intentions not found within or authorized by the statutory text.” Wyeth , 555 U.S. at 600–01 (Thomas, J., concurring). “[P]reemption arguments [ ] must be grounded in the text and structure of the [federal] statute at issue,” Klotz v. Celentano Stadtmauer & Walentowicz LLP , 991 F.3d 458, 463 (3d Cir. 2021), not in statements offered years later by members of Congress now in private practice. So courts routinely diverge from amicus filings by members of Congress. See, e.g. , Sanchez v. Mayorkas , 593 U.S. 409 (2021); In re Union Pac. R.R. Emp. Pracs. Litig. , 479 F.3d 936, 942 & n.3 (8th Cir. 2007).
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