Case: 25-1922 Document: 73 Page: 22 Date Filed: 08/14/2025
1. All Agree There Is No Express Preemption. Kalshi (like the district court) misunderstands the preemption analysis. The company’s analysis primarily hinges on just two words in the Act: “exclusive jurisdiction.” But whether a single, explicit statutory provision preempts state law is not the province of field preemption but express preemption. Appellants’ Br. 38–40. And because “[e]xpress preemption requires an explicit statement of federal law that announces and defines the scope of displaced state regulation,” the mere grant of “exclusive jurisdiction” is not enough. Transcon. Gas Pipe Line Co., LLC v. Pa. Env’t Hearing Bd. , 108 F.4th 144, 151 (3d Cir. 2024); see Am. Agric. Movement v. Bd. of Trade , 977 F.2d 1147, 1154 (7th Cir. 1992) (“No one suggests that the CEA expressly preempts state law.”). After all, the Su- preme Court has long held that Congress “must do much more to oust all of state law from a field” than simply “granting regulatory authority over [some] subject matter to a federal agency.” Kurns v. R.R. Friction Prods. Corp. , 565 U.S. 625, 638 (2012) (Kagan, J., concurring); id. at 640–41 (So- tomayor, J., concurring in part) (similar). Kalshi’s two cited cases prove the point: neither said that a grant of exclusive jurisdiction alone equated to field preemption. Appellee Br. 23– 24. One case dealt with a statutory provision giving “original and exclu- sive” jurisdiction to federal courts , not to a federal agency that shares power with other federal entities. See Transcon. Gas , 108 F.4th at 151–
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