Case: 25-1922 Document: 73 Page: 24 Date Filed: 08/14/2025
584 U.S. 453, 479 (2018); see Transcon. Gas , 108 F.4th at 156. That high standard is met only in “rare cases.” Kansas v. Garcia , 589 U.S. 191, 208 (2020). This is not one of them. Nothing remotely approaching a comprehensive federal scheme ex- ists to field preempt complementary state regulation of sports wagers when they happen to occur on CFTC-regulated exchanges. Kalshi largely points to federal regulations governing the procedures for an entity to become an CFTC-regulated exchange and certain subsequent record- keeping requirements, reporting obligations, and liquidity standards. Appellee Br. 29. But the company has no response to New Jersey’s argu- ments that field preemption cannot be inferred from regulations, or that this case has nothing to do with the mechanics of how an entity becomes (or maintains its status as) a CFTC-regulated exchange. Appellants’ Br. 41–42. As for the relevant question here—the allowable topics of event contracts—Kalshi identifies only two provisions: the special rule and its implementing regulation. Appellee Br. 29–30. Yet those (largely identical) provisions of fewer than 400 words are a far cry from the com- plete regimes governing nuclear power plants, in-air flight operations, and the other “rare cases” of field preemption. Garcia , 589 U.S. at 208. Nor does it matter that a prior opinion referred to the Commodity Exchange Act as a “comprehensive regulatory structure.” Appellee Br. 58 (citing Merrill Lynch v. Curran , 456 U.S. 353, 356 (1982)). For one, that quote is drawn from the first line of an opinion that had nothing to do
18
Made with FlippingBook - Online catalogs