Case: 25-1922 Document: 73 Page: 25 Date Filed: 08/14/2025
with preemption. For another, innumerable federal statutes could be col- loquially described as “comprehensive” without preempting the field. That is why the Supreme Court has rejected the notion that preemption can “be judged by reference to broad statements about the ‘comprehen- sive’ nature of federal regulation” in prior cases. Head v. N.M. Bd. of Ex- aminers , 374 U.S. 424, 429–30 (1963) (no preemption despite prior cases saying the Federal Communications Act was “comprehensive”); Wiscon- sin Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier , 501 U.S. 597, 613 (1991) (same for the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act). Given Congress’s “hesitation to override all state law” for sports betting and its “recogni- tion of a role for state regulation” in the special rule, the Act does not “so thoroughly occup[y] a legislative field” that “Congress left no room for the States to supplement it.” Farina , 625 F.3d at 121–22. Kalshi’s remaining arguments mistake conflict preemption—which all agree could apply in appropriate circumstances—for field preemption. Take the Act’s legislative history. While Kalshi (at 27) leans on the dele- tion of a prior savings clause, that clause preserved state laws that would “almost certainly conflict” with federal laws. Rice v. Bd. of Trade , 331 U.S. 247, 255 (1947). So with that provision removed (and exclusive ju- risdiction given to the newly created CFTC), federal law would now preempt “any substantive State law” that is “contrary to or inconsistent with Federal law.” See 120 Cong. Rec. 30,464 (Sept. 9, 1974) (Sen. Curtis). Kalshi’s cited conference report says the same. See H.R. Conf. Rep. 93-
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