Case: 25-1922 Document: 73 Page: 26 Date Filed: 08/14/2025
1383 at 35 (1974) (“[I]f any substantive State law regulating futures trad- ing was contrary to or inconsistent with Federal law, the Federal law would govern.”). But there is no indication that Congress had the clear and manifest intent to field preempt even complementary state laws— much less state gambling laws it has long accepted—just because they touch a market that also happens to be regulated by the CFTC. Kalshi’s cited cases get the company no closer to field preemption. Some did not address preemption at all. See, e.g. , Leist v. Simplot , 638 F.2d 283, 322 (2d Cir. 1980) (analyzing whether a private cause of action exists and merely stating without analysis that the Act “preempts the application of state law”); Jones v. B. C. Christopher & Co. , 466 F. Supp. 213, 220 (D. Kan. 1979) (similar). Others rejected field preemption in fa- vor of conflict preemption. See Am. Agric. , 977 F.2d at 1155 (“Congress did not intend to preempt the field of futures trading” but left “open the possibility of conflict preemption.”). For that reason, one court examined this case law and found that courts have “emphasized that Congress did not intend for the Commodity Exchange Act to preempt every field of state law that would otherwise apply to transactions falling within the scope of the Act.” Martin , 2025 WL 2194908, at *10 (citing Effex Cap., LLC v. Nat’l Futures Ass’n , 933 F.3d 882, 894 (7th Cir. 2019)). If anything, Kalshi’s cited cases prove that Congress was primarily concerned with giving the CFTC authority over certain transactions as distinct from other federal agencies. See FTC v. Ken Roberts Co. , 276 F.3d
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