Case: 25-1922 Document: 73 Page: 28 Date Filed: 08/14/2025
activity that is unlawful under any State or Federal law.” 17 C.F.R. § 40.11(a)(1). In Kalshi’s own words, “the legislative history directly con- firms” that “Congress did not want sports betting to be conducted on de- rivatives markets.” KalshiEX LLC v. CFTC , No. 24-5205, 2024 WL 4802698, at *44 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 15, 2024). Because federal law prohibits sports-related event contracts, New Jersey’s Sports Wagering Act does not stand as an obstacle to the congressional scheme by prohibiting the same thing (absent a license). Ignoring the State’s cited cases, Kalshi primarily responds by con- flating the various forms of preemption. The company argues (at 30) that applying New Jersey law to Kalshi would disrupt Congress’s goal of bringing “futures markets ‘under a uniform set of regulations.’” But Con- gress establishes total uniformity through either an express statutory provision or through such comprehensive regulation that state laws are impliedly field preempted. See supra 16–21. And for the reasons above, “Kalshi has failed to show that Congress intended for the [Act] to com- pletely preclude any [S]tate’s gaming laws from being applied to” desig- nated contract markets. Martin , 2025 WL 2194908, at *12. In contrast, conflict preemption focuses on whether state law poses an obstacle to the effectuation of federal law’s actual “text and structure.” Garcia , 589 U.S. at 208. And in that sphere, companies are often subject to simultaneous state and federal regulation. See Appellants’ Br. 52 (col-
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