Case 2:25-cv-01541-APG-DJA Document 32 Filed 09/30/25 Page 12 of 21
instruments of indebtedness, indices, and other such quantitative measures. Id. The outcome of a
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sporting event is not so limited.
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4)
The self-certification provisions of the CEA and CFTC regulations are invalid, and therefore Robinhood’s sports event contracts offered pursuant thereto are invalid
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The CEA’s self-certification provisions are invalid, rendering both the CFTC’s
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implementing regulations allowing for self-certification and the contracts issued pursuant to those
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regulations invalid. The statutory and regulatory framework governing new event contracts
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delegates sweeping authority to private entities to implement binding regulatory decisions without
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meaningful federal oversight. This violates the nondelegation doctrine, which guards precisely the
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type of unchecked, privately exercised regulatory power that Robinhood relies on to list and trade
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its sports event contracts on Kalshi’s exchange.
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The CEA establishes a self-certification process that permits registered entities to introduce
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new financial instruments, including event contracts, without prior regulatory approval. This
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scheme permits private entities, like Kalshi, to exercise extraordinary regulatory authority—
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approving, implementing, and launching nationwide sports betting—without any meaningful
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federal oversight.
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Under well-settled law, Congress may not delegate its legislative powers absent an
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“intelligible principle” to guide the exercise of discretion. Gundy v. United States , 588 U.S. 128,
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135 (2019) (citing J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States , 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928)). No
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intelligible principle exists where “‘Congress ha[s] failed to articulate any policy or standard’ to
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confine discretion.” Id . (quoting Mistretta v. United States , 488 U.S. 361, 373, n.7 (1989)). While
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the Supreme Court routinely upholds congressional delegations of power to federal agencies, it
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pays particular attention when those delegations are to private entities. See, e.g. , Carter v. Carter
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Coal Co. , 298 U.S. 238, 311 (1936). Recently, in FCC v. Consumers’ Research , 606 U.S. ___,
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145 S. Ct. 2482 (2025), the Supreme Court reinforced its nondelegation precedent, finding that the
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permissibility of a private delegation depends upon whether the agency retains oversight and
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ultimate decision-making authority over the private entity’s actions. In that case, the Supreme
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