Case 2:25-cv-01541-APG-DJA Document 32 Filed 09/30/25 Page 16 of 21
Applying that canon, the Ninth Circuit held that the ICCTA did not repeal the earlier IRWA
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on several grounds. First, it found that IRWA expressly applied to railroads, and that Congress did
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not mention or reference rights-of-way on Indian lands when it enacted the ICCTA. Second, it
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found that IRWA applied to a very specific circumstance—rights-of-way on Indian lands—
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whereas the ICCTA applied to railroad regulations broadly. In the absence of clear intention by
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Congress, the Court held that “a specific statute will not be controlled or nullified by a general one,
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regardless of the priority of enactment.” Id . at 1160 (quoting Mancari , 417 U.S. at 550–51).
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The Ninth Circuit has therefore established a clear standard by which courts should
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evaluate whether a broad statute repeals or amends an earlier Indian statute by implication: they
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must construe ambiguity liberally in favor of the Indians, and should not infer congressional intent
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to repeal an earlier, more specific statute governing activities on Indian lands without a clear
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statement from Congress.
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Applying this principle to the CEA, there is no language suggesting that Congress intended
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to repeal IGRA’s regulation of sports betting on Indian lands, let alone “clear and manifest” intent
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to repeal these key provisions of IGRA. At most, the definition of “swaps” upon which Robinhood
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relies is ambiguous as to whether it encompasses sports event contracts of the kind offered by
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Robinhood—i.e., sports betting. Ambiguity is not “clear and manifest” intent, and an ambiguous
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statutory provision cannot overcome the strong presumption against repeals by implication. It also
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implicates the Indian canon of statutory construction that requires the ambiguous definition of
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“swaps” to be interpreted in favor of tribes to maintain IGRA and all its provisions. 16 In the absence of explicit congressional intent, this Court should uphold IGRA’s very clear, specific, and
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pervasive regulatory regime for gaming on Indian lands.
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Further, the legislative history of the CEA reveals Congress’s concern about event contracts
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facilitating sports betting. As mentioned above, the Special Rule’s principal drafter explained
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Congress intended to prevent gambling via event contracts. 156 Cong. Rec. S5906–7. Rather than
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16 To the extent IGRA grants the NIGC regulatory authority over gaming on Indian lands, Congress likewise did not express its “clear and manifest” intent to repeal that authority. In fact, as noted above, Congress expressly reserved it. See 7 U.S.C. § 2(a)(1)(A).
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