2026 Membership Book FINAL

Case 2:25-cv-01541-APG-DJA Document 32 Filed 09/30/25 Page 17 of 21

demonstrate a “clear and manifest” intent to repeal IGRA, this legislative history shows the exact

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opposite: Congress designed the Special Rule to prevent sports betting through supposed event

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contracts.

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As to IGRA’s criminal provisions, Congress likewise did not express a clear and manifest

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intent to repeal DOJ’s authority. In fact, Congress expressly disclaimed such a repeal in the text of

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the CEA. 7 U.S.C. § 16(e) (“Nothing in this chapter shall supersede or preempt … criminal

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prosecution under any Federal criminal statute.”). It is impossible for the CFTC to exercise

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exclusive jurisdiction over sports event contracts while the DOJ exercises its exclusive jurisdiction

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over criminal prosecutions of violations of state gambling laws made applicable by IGRA to Indian

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lands.

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The party arguing that two statues are irreconcilable bears the “heavy burden” of proving

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congressional intent to repeal. See Epic Sys. Corp. , 584 U.S. at 510. Robinhood cannot meet that

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heavy burden because there is a reasonable interpretation of the CEA that gives full effect to both

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statutes: sports event contracts are not subject to the CFTC’s exclusive jurisdiction. Because these

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statutes are capable of coexistence, the court must read them in a way that gives effect to both.

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II. Ignoring the Applicability of IGRA Raises Serious Policy Concerns and

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Violates Federal Indian Policy

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Robinhood’s sports event contracts violate well-established federal Indian policy. The

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Supreme Court has “consistently recognized that Indian tribes retain ‘attributes of sovereignty over

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both their members and their territory.’” Cabazon , 480 U.S. at 207 (quoting United States v.

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Mazurie , 419 U.S. 544, 557 (1975)). Additionally, “the Constitution grants Congress broad

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general powers to legislate in respect to Indian tribes,” and those powers are “constantly described

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as plenary and exclusive.” United States v. Lara , 541 U.S. 193, 200 (2004). “And yet [Indian

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tribes] remain ‘separate sovereigns pre-existing the Constitution.’” Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian

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Cmty. , 572 U.S. 782, 788 (2014) (quoting Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez , 436 U.S. 49, 56

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(1978)). “A key goal of the Federal Government is to render tribes more self-sufficient, and better

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positioned to fund their own sovereign functions, rather than relying on federal funding.” Id. at

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810 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (citing 25 U.S.C. § 2702(1)).

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