Case: 25-7516, 01/23/2026, DktEntry: 33.1, Page 35 of 110
Kalshi primarily argues field preemption. It relies on the CEA’s “ex-
clusive jurisdiction” provision, but that provision says nothing about
preempting all state gaming law. The CEA’s narrow express-preemption
provisions confirm that “exclusive jurisdiction” does not preempt state gam-
ing law generally. The CEA also lacks a comprehensive regulatory scheme
for gaming. It is implausible to think that Congress made the CFTC the
Nation’s sports-betting regulator, without giving it any tools to regulate
gaming or guidance on how to do so.
Kalshi also argues conflict preemption. But Kalshi could comply with
both Nevada law and the CEA—it just chooses not to. Kalshi identifies only
one Nevada regulation that supposedly conflicts with federal law, and there
is no conflict. Nevada gaming law also does not pose an obstacle to fulfilling
the purposes of the CEA. Congress enacted the CEA to “bring[] risky finan-
cial products out of the shadows,” not to “enabl[e] nationwide gambling on
CFTC-designated exchanges.” 1-ER-20.
II. As the district court found, the balance of equities weighs against
Kalshi. Kalshi identifies no clear error in that finding.
A. Kalshi’s claimed harms are speculative and self-inflicted. It ag-
gressively expanded its business in the face of legal uncertainty and express
warnings by the district court and the CFTC. Kalshi wishes to avoid the
costs of geofencing, but its competitors pay those costs, and the costs are
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