Case: 25-7516, 01/23/2026, DktEntry: 33.1, Page 45 of 110
under Section 1a(47)(A)(ii). 2 Kalshi also relies (Br. 49) on a proposed rule-
making that would have strengthened the prohibition on gaming on DCMs
—but that also did not interpret Section 1a(47)(A)(ii)’s definition of swap;
instead, it involved the Special Rule, which applies to “agreements, con-
tracts, transactions, or swaps,” not just “swaps.” 7 U.S.C. § 7a-2(c)(5)(C)(i);
see 89 Fed. Reg. at 48969.
Second, Kalshi argues (Br. 50) that distinguishing “outcomes” from
“events” could create “interpretive difficulties,” because any “event” could
be recharacterized as the “outcome” of a prior “event.” But the fact that an
event ( e.g. , a mortgage default) could be the outcome of an underlying event
( e.g. , a recession) does not negate the fact that the first event is a significant
independent event. This argument, like Kalshi’s other textual arguments,
would make the definition of “swap” limitless. See 1-ER-12.
Third, Kalshi argues (Br. 50-51) that defining “event” as distinct from
“outcome” would be inconsistent with Nevada gaming law, which defines a
“sports pool” as the business of “accepting wagers on sporting events.” NRS
§ 463.0193. There is no inconsistency, because Nevada defines “wager” as
“a sum of money” that is “risked on an occurrence for which the outcome is
uncertain.” Id. § 463.01962 (emphasis added). Thus, Nevada gaming law
2 See Pub. Serv. Co. of Colo. v. Cont’l Cas. Co. , 26 F.3d 1508 (10th Cir. 1994); KalshiEX LLC v. CFTC , 2024 WL 4164694 (D.D.C. Sept. 12, 2024); CFTC v. Trade Exch. Network Ltd. , 117 F. Supp. 3d 29 (D.D.C. 2015).
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