Case: 25-7516, 01/23/2026, DktEntry: 33.1, Page 50 of 110
Under Kalshi’s interpretation, part (ii) would lose the common thread
and swallow the rest of the definition. If part (ii) reaches contracts “on an-
ything that happens or could happen,” 1-ER-13, then the remaining parts
are left with nothing to do, 1-ER-20. This Court should not adopt a reading
that makes most of the “swaps” definition “superfluous, void, or insignifi-
cant.” GCIU-Emp. Ret. Fund v. MNG Enters., Inc. , 51 F.4th 1092, 1097 (9th
Cir. 2022).
Kalshi responds (Br. 53) that its reading simply creates “overlap.” But
its interpretation of part (ii) does not merely overlap with the other parts—
it makes them all superfluous. Kalshi does not identify any swap that would
not come within its reading of part (ii). Kalshi argues (Br. 52) that part (ii)
should be read broadly because part (iv) includes agreements that “become[]
commonly known to the trade as swap,” 7 U.S.C. § 1a(47)(A)(iv), and be-
cause Congress excluded certain contracts from the definition of swap, see
id. § 1a(47)(B). Neither makes sense. If part (ii) is read broadly to cover
any possible event contract, then part (iv) is meaningless, and Section
1a(47)(B) does not suggest or imply that broad construction of part (ii).
Kalshi asserts (Br. 51-52) that because the Special Rule allows the
CFTC to prohibit contracts involving “gaming,” those contracts must be
“swaps” under the CEA. That is wrong, because the Special Rule is not
limited to “swaps”; it applies to “agreements, contracts, transactions, or
swaps.” 7 U.S.C. § 7a-2(c)(5)(C)(i). Further, the Special Rule is a backstop
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