2026 Membership Book FINAL

Case: 25-7516, 01/23/2026, DktEntry: 33.1, Page 52 of 110

credit default swaps had exacerbated the crisis. 1-ER-16; see Inv. Co. Inst.

v. CFTC , 891 F. Supp. 2d 162, 172-73 (D.D.C. 2012). Congress “aimed Dodd-

Frank at systemic risks in the financial sector that undermined U.S. finan-

cial stability.” 1-ER-16.

The Dodd-Frank Act was not about regulating sports or election bet-

ting. “Congress was bringing risky financial products out of the shadows,”

not “enabling nationwide gambling.” 1-ER-20. Sports betting did not con-

tribute to the financial crisis; indeed, at the time, it was illegal everywhere

but Nevada. See Murphy , 584 U.S. at 462. Congress did not mention gam-

ing in the definition of “swaps,” and the legislative record nowhere evidences

a discussion of regulating sports bets as swaps. And Congress added the

Special Rule to ensure that gambling does not occur on CFTC-regulated

DCMs. See 156 Cong. Rec. S5906-07 (July 15, 2010) (colloquy between Sen-

ators Feinstein and Lincoln explaining that sports bets should not be on

DCMs because they “would not serve any real commercial purpose” and

“would be used solely for gambling”).

Notably, the CFTC has rejected a maximalist reading of “swap.” In

2012, it promulgated a regulation defining “swap” to exclude “consumer and

commercial arrangements that historically have not been considered

swaps”—such as “traditional insurance products,” “mortgages,” “automobile

loans,” and “employment contracts”—even though these products could fall

within an expansive interpretation of Section 1a(47)(ii). Further Definition

34

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