Case: 25-7516, 01/23/2026, DktEntry: 33.1, Page 57 of 110
Amicus Br. 31. But under Kalshi’s position, there would be no off-exchange
sports wagers, because the CEA requires all consumer swaps, options, and
futures to be traded on DCMs.
The CEA’s language is clear on this point. Section 2(e) makes it “un-
lawful” for “any person” to “enter into a swap” unless that swap “is entered
into on, or subject to the rules of, a [DCM],” except when both parties are
regulated financial institutions, major corporations, or similar entities. 7
U.S.C. § 2(e); see id. § 1a(18). Section 6(a) makes it “unlawful” for “any per-
son” to “enter into” any transaction involving a future unless the transaction
is “conducted on or subject to the rules of a [DCM].” Id. § 6(a); see CFTC v.
Frankwell Bullion Ltd. , 99 F.3d 299, 301 (9th Cir. 1996). And Section 6c(c)
directs the CFTC to issue regulations requiring all options be traded on
DCMs, 7 U.S.C. § 6c(c), which it has done, see 17 C.F.R. § 33.3(a). Thus,
there could be no “off-exchange” sports betting under Kalshi’s view.
Attempting to escape from the consequences of its position, Kalshi ar-
gues (Dkt. 28.1, at 3) that Section 2(a)(1)(A)’s savings clause nullifies Sec-
tion 2(e). The savings clause provides that nothing in the CEA’s “exclusive
jurisdiction” provision “supersede[s] or limit[s]” the jurisdiction of state reg-
ulatory authorities or “restrict[s]” those authorities from carrying out their
duties. 7 U.S.C. § 2(a)(1)(A). According to Kalshi, Section 2(e) cannot re-
quire sports bets (as swaps) to be traded on DCMs, because that would “re-
strict” the authority of state regulators over those bets. But Section 2(e)
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