Case: 25-7516, 01/23/2026, DktEntry: 33.1, Page 63 of 110
1. Field Preemption Does Not Apply Field preemption applies where federal law “so thoroughly occupies a
legislative field” that it leaves “no room” for state regulation. Nat’l Fed’n of
the Blind v. United Airlines Inc. , 813 F.3d 718, 733 (9th Cir. 2016). Even if
a statute suggests some preemptive intent, courts should “avoid interpret-
ing the scope of the preempted field too broadly.” Martin , 793 F. Supp. 3d
at 680 (quoting Sikkelee v. Precision Airmotive Corp. , 882 F.3d 680, 689 (3d
Cir. 2016)); see Medtronic , 518 U.S. at 484. Nothing shows that Congress
intended to preempt state gaming law in particular . Martin , 793 F. Supp.
3d at 680; see Mass. PI Order 10-13.
a. The CEA’s text does not show a clear intent to preempt state gaming law Kalshi’s argument (Br. 27-28) rests almost entirely on Section
2(a)(1)(A), the CEA’s “exclusive jurisdiction” provision, taking the most ex-
pansive view of that provision as possible. But courts do not read statutory
provisions in isolation, Sackett v. EPA , 598 U.S. 651, 674 (2023), or read
preemptive provisions expansively, Altria , 555 U.S. at 77, especially in ar-
eas of traditional state regulation, Medtronic , 518 U.S. at 485. When read
in context, it is clear that this provision has a more modest scope.
Section 2(a)(1)(A) says nothing about state gaming law. As the Su-
preme Court explained, Congress enacted this provision “only to consolidate
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