Case: 25-7516, 01/23/2026, DktEntry: 33.1, Page 66 of 110
Second, Kalshi cites (Br. 29) the savings clause in Section 2(a)(1)(A).
That clause states that, “[e]xcept as hereinabove provided” (in the “exclusive
jurisdiction clause”), “nothing contained in this section shall [] supersede or
limit” the “jurisdiction conferred” on “regulatory authorities under the laws”
of “any State.” 7 U.S.C. § 2(a)(1)(A). According to Kalshi (Br. 29), this
clause shows that the exclusive-jurisdiction provision has preemptive effect.
But the clause equally suggests the opposite, because “[a] savings clause
generally ‘negates the inference that Congress left no room for state causes
of action.’ ” Martin , 793 F. Supp. 3d at 682 (quoting Int’l Paper Co. v. Oul-
lette , 479 U.S. 481, 492 (1987)). And even if the savings clause suggests that
the CEA has some preemptive effect, it does not support the view that the
preempted field includes gaming .
b. The CEA contains no comprehensive regula- tory scheme for gaming The CEA does not contain a comprehensive regulatory scheme for
gaming. Indeed, it lacks the most basic features of such a scheme. The CEA
does not require licensing or background checks, indicate what bets are al-
lowed, contain protections against insider betting or unfair bets, or provide
for basic consumer protections (such as age restrictions or measures to ad-
dress problem gaming and organized crime). The CEA requires DCMs to be
certified, but then allows trading based on self-certifications. 7 U.S.C.
§§ 6a(a), 13.
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