Case: 25-7516, 01/23/2026, DktEntry: 33.1, Page 76 of 110
not a conflict-preemption argument. See, e.g. , Montalvo v. Spirit Airlines ,
508 F.3d 464, 471 (9th Cir. 2007); Martin , 793 F. Supp. 3d at 685; Mass. PI
Order 13-14. Conflict preemption assumes that States may regulate, and
may regulate nonuniformly. See Wyeth , 555 U.S. at 575.
Kalshi cites (Br. 38-40) Arizona v. United States , 567 U.S. 387 (2012),
to argue that allowing State Defendants to enforce Nevada law would inter-
fere with Congress’s “chosen method of enforcement.” Id. at 406. That is
incorrect. This form of obstacle preemption occurs when a State seeks to
supplement federal enforcement of conduct that violates federal law—for
example, when Arizona sought to penalize violations of federal immigration
law. Id. at 403. The Supreme Court invalidated that scheme because it
would interfere with the discretion Congress gave to the Executive Branch
to enforce federal law. Id. at 406. Nothing like that is happening here.
State Defendants seek only to enforce Nevada gaming law, not the CEA.
II. THE BALANCE OF HARDSHIPS WEIGHS HEAVILY AGAINST KALSHI Aside from the merits, a preliminary injunction is not warranted be-
cause the balance of hardships weighs heavily against Kalshi. The most
Kalshi can say is that it may have to pay a relatively small amount of money
to stop operating in Nevada while this case proceeds—which pales in com-
parison to the severe and ongoing harms Kalshi is causing Nevada, its gam-
ing industry, and the public.
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