Case: 25-7504, 01/16/2026, DktEntry: 38.1, Page 18 of 47
altering, superseding, or otherwise affecting the application of the In- dian Gaming Regulatory Act.” Id. § 5365(b)(3)(B). In this way, the stat- ute adheres to the “general rule” that “States should have the primary responsibility for determining what forms of gambling may legally take place within their borders.” H.R. Rep. No. 109-412, pt. 2, at 8 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 3001). D. Murphy and Its Aftermath In 2018, the Supreme Court changed the legal landscape, holding that PASPA’s attempt to “prohibit[] state authorization of sports gam- bling” violated the Tenth Amendment’s anticommandeering principle. Murphy v. NCAA , 584 U.S. 453, 474 (2018). In reaching that conclusion, the Court observed that PASPA’s prohibition was “exactly the opposite” of the “coherent federal policy” embodied in other statutes, like the Wire Act, that “respect the policy choices of the people of each State.” Id. at 484. The Court left the door open to future Congressional action, observ- ing that Congress could always “regulate sports gambling directly,” id. at 486, rather than, as in PASPA, trying to “dictate[] what a state legis- lature may and may not do,” id. at 474. In the absence of such direct Congressional regulation, however, the Court emphasized that “each
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