Case 2:25-cv-00575-APG-BNW Document 57 Filed 05/14/25 Page 8 of 25
matters beyond the confines of” the exclusive -jurisdiction provision. FTC v. Ken Roberts Co. , 276
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F.3d 583, 591 (D.C. Cir. 2001). Further, Section 40.11(a) categorically excludes those contracts
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relating to “terrorism, assassination, war, gaming, or an activity that is unlawful under any State
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or Federal law.” Kalshi’s arguments render this provision meaningless, because any State law
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would be preempted as a result of the self-certification of the event contract to the CFTC, meaning
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that there could never be a situation where a contract related to activity that is “unlawful under
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any State law.”
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For the NRA members, the above situation is untenable. The CFTC initiated a review and
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suspended trading for some, but not all, potential competitors seeking to offer sports betting. For
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companies like ErisX and Crypto.com, Nevada’s gaming regulations still apply in full force, but
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these same regulations are preempted with respect to Kalshi? For the NRA members, their Nevada
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gaming licenses would somehow become simultaneously required, obsolete, mandatory, and
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irrelevant when it comes to offering sports betting.
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B.
The NRA Is Entitled to Intervene as a Matter of Right.
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Rule 24(a)(2) provides, in relevant part, that “[o]n timely motion, the court must permit
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anyone to intervene who . . . claims an interest relating to the property or transaction that is the
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subject of the action, and is so situated that disposing of the action may as a practical matter impair
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or impede the movant’s ability to protect its interest, unless existing parties a dequately represent
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that interest.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2). Consistent with this language, the Ninth Circuit identified
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four requirements for non- statutory intervention of right: “(1) [the applicant] has a significant
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protectable interest as to the property or transaction that is the subject of the action; (2) the
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disposition of the action may, as a practical matter, impair or impede the applicant’s ability to
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protect its interest; (3) the application is timely; and (4) the existing parties may not adequately
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meet the applicant’s interest.” Cal. Dep’t of Toxic Substances Control v. Jim Dobbas, Inc. , 54
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F.4th 1078, 1086 (9th Cir. 2022). Associations and similar representative groups may intervene
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on behalf of their individual members’ interests. See, e.g. , United States v. Carpenter , 526 F.3d
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1237, 1240 (9th Cir. 2008); Wineries of the Old Mission Peninsula Ass’n v. T wp. of Peninsula , 41
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F.4th 767, 771 (6th Cir. 2022); Sierra Club v. Espy , 18 F.3d 1202, 1206 (5th Cir. 1994).
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