Case 2:25-cv-00575-APG-BNW Document 57 Filed 05/14/25 Page 12 of 25
(especially by paying gaming taxes 2 ). By framing its “sports bet by another name” products as
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outside of Nevada’s purview, Kalshi wants an exemption from those rules— i.e. , it intends to
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compete for the same sports betting customers with fewer regulatory requirements and without
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paying gaming taxes. That places NRA members at a potential competitive disadvantage,
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diminishing the attendant value of their gaming licenses.
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Courts have recognized that the competitive disadvantage in the market (and specifically
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the gaming industry) establishes “a legally protected interest in the action that may be impaired if
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intervention is denied.” Connecticut v. United States Dep’t of the Interior , 344 F. Supp. 3d 279,
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298 (D.D.C. 2018). In Connecticut , the Court addressed whether MGM, a casino operator, had an
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interest in a case involving amendments to federally imposed procedures authorizing gambling
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within Connecticut. See generally id. There, the p laintiff, the state of Connecticut, sought “to
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overturn the Secretary’s failure to approve a compact amendment that would give the Tribes an
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advantage in the state commercial casino market over private casino developers like MGM.” Id.
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at 298. The Court concluded that MGM, as a competitor at risk of suffering a competitive
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disadvantage, had “competitor standing” to intervene and in turn demonstrated a legally protected
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interest in the action sufficient to satisfy Rule 24. Id. at 299; see also id. at 304 (concluding that
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for “the same reasons MGM has standing to intervene,” including that the federal decision “would
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immediately diminish MGM’s chances of securing state approval” for its casino over a tribal
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casino and “would create imminent competition” for MGM, MGM “demonstrated a legally
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protected interest in the action that may be impaired if intervention is denied.”).
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Second, the NRA’s members have a protectable interest in operating under their licenses
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in a well- regulated market. Kalshi’s circumvention of the above regulatory scheme threatens to
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allow unregulated gaming establishments to operate in Nevada’s gaming market , or at least those
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that the CFTC lets slip through via self-certification. This will erode public confidence and trust
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in the industry, which “can only be maintained by strict regulation of all persons, locations,
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2 The Nevada Gaming Control Board reported $482 million in sports betting revenue in 2024, most of which was from large operators, meaning that the State took in tens of millions in tax revenues from sports betting. Monthly Revenue Report , Nevada Gaming Control Board at 1-2 (December 2024), https://tinyurl.com/4w2artsf.
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