Case 2:25-cv-00575-APG-BNW Document 57 Filed 05/14/25 Page 19 of 25
around sporting events such as the Super Bowl, the Kentucky Derby, and
1
Masters Golf Tournament. These types of contracts would not serve any
2
real commercial purpose. Rather, they would be used solely for gambling.
3
Cong. Rec. S5906-07 (daily ed. July 15, 2010) (statements of Senator Dianne Feinstein and
4
Senator Blanche Lincoln)). Reliance on Kalshi’s argumentation, without the NRA’s intervention,
5
could reach a result that is diametrically opposite of what was intended by Congress.
6
As to the definition of swaps, this Court properly and first examined at the April 8 hearing¸
7
see Hr’g Tr. (Rough), Apr. 8, 2025 at 5:4-13:1 —whether Kalshi’s sports event contracts are
8
“swaps” as defined by the CEA. See ECF No. 34 (not mentioning the word “swap”); ECF No. 50
9
at 13 (merely arguing that “Kalshi failed to allege facts demonstrating that its contracts fit within”
10
the definition of a swap). T here are multiple independent reasons why Kalshi’s sports event
11
contracts are not swaps within the meaning of the CEA. As a textual matter, the outcome of a
12
sports game is generally not “associated with potential financial, economic, or commercial
13
consequence[s],” see 7 U.S.C. § 1a(47)(A)(ii), nor is a sports event contract commonly known as
14
a “swap,” see id. § 1a(47)(A)(iv), or a “combination or permutation of, or option on” ordinary
15
swaps, see id. § 1a(47)(A)(vi). Kalshi’s overbroad definition of “swap”— as the Court noted,
16
“anything could be a swap,” Hr’g Tr. (Rough), Apr. 8, 2025 at 8:18-9:4 — simply belies the limited
17
scope of the CEA’s statutory definition, focused as it is on financial and economic instruments
18
and measures, see 7 U.S.C. § 1a(47)(i), (iii), (v); see also Beecham v. United States , 511 U.S. 368,
19
371 (1994) (“That several items in a list share an attribute counsels in favor of interpreting the
20
other items as possessing that attribute as well.”). Kalshi continues to mistake the economic
21
consequences of the sporting event itself with the economic consequences of the “outcome” of the
22
sporting event, which is the subject of the event contract. The NRA is uniquely situated to explain
23
to the Court the details and significance of the various wagers offered by Kalshi and the NRA
24
members, and how these wagers are not associated with financial, economic, or commercial
25
consequences.
26
Substantive canons of construction additionally militate against Kalshi’s categorization of
27
sports event contracts as swaps. By permitting unregulated sports betting that is specifically
28
Page 18 of 24
Made with FlippingBook - Online catalogs