Case 1:25-cv-02152-ESK-MJS Document 15 Filed 04/18/25 Page 22 of 51 PageID: 143
Homeland Sec. , 108 F.4th 194, 200 (3d Cir. 2024) (cleaned up). The “primary purpose of a preliminary injunction is maintenance of the status quo until a de- cision on the merits of a case is rendered.” Acierno v. New Castle County , 40 F.3d 645, 647 (3d Cir. 1994). To obtain relief, the movant must first “meet the thresh- old for the first two ‘most critical’ factors: it must demonstrate that it can win on the merits” and “that it is more likely than not to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief.” Reilly v. City of Harrisburg , 858 F.3d 173, 179 (3d Cir. 2017). “If these gateway factors are met, a court then considers the remain- ing two factors”—the balance of equities and public interest—“and determines in its sound discretion if all four factors, taken together, balance in favor of grant- ing the requested preliminary relief.” Id . Where the State is a defendant, the last two factors merge. See Nken v. Holder , 556 U.S. 418, 435 (2009). ARGUMENT I. Kalshi will not succeed on the merits because the CEA does not preempt the New Jersey Sports Wagering Act. “Federal law can preempt state law in three ways: (1) express preemption; (2) field preemption; or (3) conflict preemption.” Klotz v. Celentano Stadtmauer & Walentowicz LLP , 991 F.3d 458, 463 (3d Cir. 2021) (footnote omitted). Kalshi presses only the latter two theories: field and conflict preemption. Both fail. A. The presumption against preemption applies to the New Jersey Sports Wagering Act. While federal law is the “supreme Law of the Land,” U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2, Kalshi must clear a high bar from the outset: “all preemption cases ‘start with the assumption that the historic police powers of the States were not to be
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