Case 1:25-cv-02152-ESK-MJS Document 15 Filed 04/18/25 Page 23 of 51 PageID: 144
superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.’” Sikkelee v. Precision Airmotive Corp. , 822 F.3d 680, 687 (3d Cir. 2016) (quoting Wyeth v. Levine , 555 U.S. 555, 565 (2009)). Applying even this baseline presumption, courts must disfavor preemption when faced with two plausible readings of a statute. Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC , 544 U.S. 431, 449 (2005); see also Bruesewitz v. Wyeth, Inc. , 561 F.3d 233, 240 (3d Cir. 2009). But this presump- tion is even stronger when Congress has legislated “in a field which the States have traditionally occupied.” Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr , 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996); Pennsylvania v. Navient Corp. , 967 F.3d 273, 288 (3d Cir. 2020) (same). Regulation of gambling is exactly such a field. States have long regulated gambling in this country. See Murphy , 584 U.S. at 458–9. That is unsurprising because regulation of gambling is undoubtedly at the core of a State’s traditional police powers. See Ah Sin v. Wittman , 198 U.S. 500, 505–06 (1905) (“The sup- pression of gambling is concededly within the police powers of a state.”); WV Ass’n of Club Owners & Fraternal Servs., Inc. v. Musgrave , 553 F.3d 292, 302 (4th Cir. 2009) (“[R]egulating gambling is at the core of the state’s residual powers as a sovereign in our constitutional scheme.”); Hawkeye Commodity Promotions, Inc. v. Vilsack , 486 F.3d 430, 439 (8th Cir. 2007) (“A state’s police power encom- passes controlling gambling.”); Artichoke Joe’s Cal. Grand Casino v. Norton , 353 F.3d 712, 737 (9th Cir. 2003) (noting “the regulation of gambling lies at the heart of the state’s police power”); Johnson v. Collins Entm’t Co., Inc. , 199 F.3d 710, 720 (4th Cir. 1999) (same); United States v. Washington , 879 F.2d 1400, 1401 (6th Cir. 1989) (similar). The reason for this is obvious: gambling is a potentially harmful
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