Case 1:25-cv-02152-ESK-MJS Document 15 Filed 04/18/25 Page 28 of 51 PageID: 149
The Supreme Court has explained that this exclusive-jurisdiction provision was “intended only to consolidate federal regulation of commodity futures trading in the Commission” and to “separate the functions of the [CFTC] from those of the [SEC] and other regulatory agencies.” Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran , 456 U.S. 353, 386–87 (1982). That is, its purpose was merely “to remedy the confusion about whether certain types of commodities transactions came within the definition of a security and thus subject to regulation under the securities laws.” R. J. Hereley & Son Co. v. Stotler & Co. , 466 F. Supp. 345, 347 (N.D. Ill. 1979). But this provision evinces no intent to preempt the entire field of all derivatives trading regulation. Other language in the exclusive-jurisdiction provision confirms that it does not occupy the field of derivatives trading to the exclusion of state law. For instance, in the preservation of state-court jurisdiction in the savings clause, Congress made clear: “Nothing in this section shall supersede or limit the juris- diction conferred on courts” of “any State.” 7 U.S.C. § 2(a)(1)(A). A savings clause generally “negates the inference that Congress left no room for state causes of action.” Int’l Paper Co. v. Ouellette , 479 U.S. 481, 492 (1987); Farina v. Nokia Inc. , 625 F.3d 97, 121 (3d Cir. 2010). Courts interpreting this clause agree: Congress “did not manifest an intent to occupy completely the entire field of commodity futures regulation.” See, e.g. , Effex Capital, LLC v. Nat’l Futures Ass’n , 933 F.3d 882, 894 (7th Cir. 2019); Am. Agric. Movement, Inc. v. Bd. of Trade , 977 F.2d 1147, 1155 (7th Cir. 1992) (holding this “savings clause” is “designed to preserve in the futures trading context at least some state law causes of actions”);
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