Case 1:25-cv-02152-ESK-MJS Document 15 Filed 04/18/25 Page 29 of 51 PageID: 150
accord Kerr v. First Commodity Corp. , 735 F.2d 281, 288 (8th Cir. 1984). In fact, the savings clause was added to allay fears that the exclusive-jurisdiction provi- sion “might oust the courts’ jurisdiction over typical state law claims.” Patry v. Rosenthal & Co. , 534 F. Supp. 545, 548–49 (D. Kan. 1982). In other words, the CFTC’s exclusive jurisdiction was meant to be “exclusive” as to other federal agencies, not state-law regulations and claims. Two other provisions of the CEA also confirm that Congress did not leg- islate so comprehensively as to leave no room for state law. The CEA’s special rule for review of event contracts provides that the CEA “may determine” that “agreements, contracts, transactions, or swaps in excluded commodities that are based upon the occurrence, extent of an occurrence, or contingency” are “con- trary to the public interest” and therefore prohibited if they involve “activity that is unlawful under any Federal or State law.” 7 U.S.C. § 7a-2(c)(5)(C)(i); see also 17 C.F.R. § 40.11(a). As this statutory text makes abundantly clear, Congress expressly incorporated state law into the determination of whether an event con- tract should be prohibited. And where “a federal statute expressly incorporates state law,” it makes sense that a “preemption analysis is inappropriate.” Cf. Power v. Arlington Hosp. Ass’n , 42 F.3d 851, 864 (4th Cir. 1994). Congress obvi- ously leaves “room for supplementary state legislation” where it expressly relies on and incorporates that state legislation. Kansas , 589 U.S. at 208. The CFTC’s own interpretation of the special rule bolsters this conclusion. In litigation over Kalshi’s election-gambling event contracts, the CFTC ex- plained that the CEA does not preempt state election-gambling laws: the
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