Case 1:25-cv-02152-ESK-MJS Document 15 Filed 04/18/25 Page 33 of 51 PageID: 154
markets. See PI Br. at 16–17. But Kalshi cites no federal provision that regulates the types of event contracts that may be listed on CFTC-designated markets— other that the special rule itself, which (as discussed above) expressly incorpo- rates state law. Compare id. , with supra at 19–21. Instead, the company’s argu- ment essentially boils down to the words “exclusive jurisdiction” in the exclu- sive-jurisdiction provision. See PI Br. at 13, 14–17. The Third Circuit has rejected similar arguments before. See Farina , 625 F.3d at 121 (no field preemption de- spite “Congress’s delegation of ‘exclusive authority’” over radio-frequency- emission regulation). And this Court should reject it again. Regardless, two words are hardly a “comprehensive” scheme. By contrast, where courts find that the federal government has occupied a field, the statutory framework is comprehensive and “reflects a congressional decision to foreclose any state regulation in the area, even if it is parallel to federal standards.” Arizona v. United States , 567 U.S. 387, 401–02 (2012) (field of alien registration); see also, e.g. , Abdullah v. Am. Airlines, Inc. , 181 F.3d 363, 368–72 (3d Cir. 1999) (field of aviation safety). Where, as here, federal law contains savings clauses preserving state law, references state law in determining eligibility of certain transactions, and expressly preempts some (but not all) state law, Congress plainly intended to account for—and not to foreclose—state legislation. 2. Nothing in the case law or legislative history of the CEA indicates that Congress meant to field preempt state sports-wagering laws regulating event contracts. Kalshi’s contrary arguments do not support field preemption. The com- pany relies on two cases for its broad interpretation of “exclusive jurisdiction,”
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