Case 1:25-cv-02152-ESK-MJS Document 15 Filed 04/18/25 Page 35 of 51 PageID: 156
Bell , 556 S.W.2d 420, 423–25 (Ark. 1977) (CEA preempted Arkansas Securities Act). Kalshi cites no case holding that Congress occupied the entire field of de- rivatives trading on CFTC-regulated exchanges to the exclusion of state law. Kalshi’s cited legislative history does not help its argument either. See PI Br. 15. Initially, Kalshi’s reliance on the statements of individual legislators does not provide strong evidence of legislative intent. Courts generally do not rely on remarks of individual legislators—even bill sponsors—to ascertain congressional intent. See, e.g. , Mims v. Arrow Fin. Servs., LLC , 565 U.S. 368, 385 (2012) (“the views of a single legislator, even a bill’s sponsor, are not controlling”); Szehinskyj v. Att’y Gen. , 432 F.3d 253, 256 (3d Cir. 2005) (It is a “well-known admonition that what individual legislators say a statute will do, and what the language of the statute provides, may be far apart indeed.”). In any event, those statements do not support the broad preemption Kalshi seeks. For instance, Senator Curtis noted that the CEA would only preempt state law if it “were contrary to or in- consistent with Federal law”—a different standard from field preemption. See 120 Cong. Rec. 30, 464 (Sept. 9, 1974) (statement of Senator Curtis), https://ti- nyurl.com/5n7nds2n. And while Senator Clark argued that “different state laws would just lead to total chaos,” his statement was in reference to a hypothetical Nevada law prohibiting trading in futures markets in direct conflict of federal law. See Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act: Hearings Before the Senate Com- mittee on Agriculture & Forestry , 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 685 (1974). Neither statement proves that Congress intended, much less had the “clear and manifest” intent,
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