Case 1:25-cv-02152-ESK-MJS Document 15 Filed 04/18/25 Page 36 of 51 PageID: 157
to supersede generally applicable laws within a state’s historic police powers, like the New Jersey Sports Wagering Act. See Sikkelee , 822 F.3d at 687. The recent decision from the District of Nevada in KalshiEX, LLC v. Hen- drick , No. 2:25-CV-00575-APG-BNW, 2025 WL 1073495 (D. Nev. Apr. 9, 2025), does not change this conclusion. There, the court preliminarily enjoined Nevada from enforcing its election-gambling and sports-gambling laws against Kalshi. Id. at *8. The court held that the CEA preempted Nevada’s laws because the exclusive-jurisdiction provision “reflects congressional intent to occupy the field of regulating CFTC-designated exchanges and the transactions conducted on those exchanges.” Id. at *6. But the court failed to consider various CEA provisions in any depth, including (1) the threshold inapplicability of the exclu- sive-jurisdiction provision, see supra at 15–17; (2) the savings clauses, see supra at 18–19; (3) the special rule’s reference to state law, see supra at 19–21; and (4) the CEA’s narrow express-preemption provisions that do not cover Kalshi sports- related event contracts, see supra at 21–22. In effect, the court ruled that event contracts are immune from any state law—tax laws, disclosure laws, and others. But Congress never intended such sweeping immunity. This Court should in- stead hold that Kalshi is unlikely to succeed on its field-preemption claim. C. Regulation of these event contracts under New Jersey’s Sports Wagering Act is not an obstacle to the purposes of the CEA. Kalshi’s conflict-preemption claim is even weaker. Conflict preemption arises only “where it is impossible for a private party to comply with both state and federal law, or where under the circumstances of a particular case, the
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