Case 1:25-cv-02152-ESK-MJS Document 15 Filed 04/18/25 Page 37 of 51 PageID: 158
challenged state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.” MD Mall Assocs., LLC v. CSX Transp., Inc. , 715 F.3d 479, 495 (3d Cir. 2013) (citation omitted). “The mere fact of ‘tension’ between federal and state law,” on the other hand, “is generally not enough to establish an obstacle supporting preemption.” Id. Whether conflict preemption applies “is a matter of judgment, to be informed by examining the federal statute as a whole and identifying its purpose and intended effects.” Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council , 530 U.S. 363, 373 (2000). Here, everyone agrees that it is not “impossible” for Kalshi “to comply with both state and fed- eral law.” MD Mall Assocs., LLC , 715 F.3d at 495. Rather, Kalshi argues that New Jersey’s Sports Wagering Act stands as an obstacle to the intended purpose and effect of the CEA. See PI Br. 18–21. But Kalshi is wrong. 1. The New Jersey Sports Wagering Act furthers rather than impedes the CEA. Nothing in the Sports Wagering Act stands as an obstacle to the purposes and objectives of the CEA. The CEA is meant to provide “a system of effective self-regulation of trading facilities, clearing systems, market participants and market professionals under the oversight of the [CFTC].” 7 U.S.C. § 5(b). And it is intended “to deter and prevent price manipulation or any other disruptions to market integrity”; “to ensure the financial integrity of all transactions subject to [the CEA] and the avoidance of systemic risk”; “to protect all market partici- pants from fraudulent or other abusive sales practices and misuses of customer
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