Case 1:25-cv-02152-ESK-MJS Document 15 Filed 04/18/25 Page 40 of 51 PageID: 161
Kalshi does not identify any obstacle to the purposes and objec- tives of the CEA.
2.
Kalshi’s contrary arguments do not support obstacle preemption. To begin, the Sports Wagering Act does not undermine the intended purpose of the CEA “to bring futures markets regulation ‘under a uniform set of regulations’” by subjecting Kalshi “to multiple conflicting legal regimes.” PI Br. 19. The CEA expressly recognizes the applicability of both state gaming law and state laws otherwise prohibiting certain activity related to an event contract. See 7 U.S.C. § 7a-2(c)(5)(C)(i)(I); supra at 19–21. This indicates that Congress was aware of state laws in this area and incorporated, rather than preempted, them. And the Sports Wagering Act, even as applied to Kalshi’s event contracts, does not regulate (and so does not undermine the CFTC’s regulation of) the futures market. See Am. Agric. Movement, Inc. , 977 F.2d at 1157 (“Laws of general application … are preempted only when plaintiffs attempt to use them in a man- ner that would, in effect, regulate the futures markets.”). Rather, the Act’s im- position of licensure and related requirements on an entity in order to offer sports wagers in New Jersey—including sports wagers in the form of event contracts— does not impede the CFTC’s ability to regulate that event contract. An entity like Kalshi can obtain a license from New Jersey to offer sports wagers in the State and remain under the oversight of the CFTC as a designated contract mar- ket. Cf. Strax v. Commodity Exch., Inc. , 524 F. Supp. 936, 942 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (CFTC did not preempt state antitrust law since “[t]he mere fact that the New York attorney general is empowered to investigate and prosecute restraints of
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