Case 1:25-cv-02152-ESK-MJS Document 15 Filed 04/18/25 Page 42 of 51 PageID: 163
same conduct. See California v. ARC Am. Corp. , 490 U.S. 93, 105 (1989) (“Ordi- narily, state causes of action are not pre-empted solely because they impose lia- bility over and above that authorized by federal law.”). Such differences are gen- erally not “sufficient both to indicate congressional intent to preempt overlap- ping state law.” Green , 245 F.3d at 227. Were it otherwise, “federal law would preempt overlapping state law every time federal law did not exactly mirror all the state law or state laws in question.” Id. Similarly, the Sports Wagering Act’s prohibition on a small subset of sports wagers in New Jersey does not conflict with the CEA merely because the CFTC has so far not prohibited Kalshi’s event contracts involving sports wagers. See PI Br. 18–21. “The Supremacy Clause gives priority to ‘the Laws of the United States,’ not the criminal law enforcement priorities or preferences of fed- eral officers.” Kansas , 589 U.S. at 212. So the “mere fact that state laws” overlap with federal provisions “does not even begin to make a case for conflict preemp- tion.” Id. at 211. “[I]n the vast majority of cases where federal and state laws overlap,” the Supreme Court has explained that “allowing the States to prose- cute is entirely consistent with federal interests.” Id. at 212. That is, “States are independent sovereigns in our federal system; they do not need Congress’s permission to exercise their historic police powers.” See Just Puppies, Inc. v. Brown , 123 F.4th 652, 664 (4th Cir. 2024) (finding Maryland law prohibiting retail sale of puppies did not stand as an obstacle to the Animal Wel- fare Act because the areas it regulates “are a floor”—it “does not prohibit state and local governments from adopting additional standards”). New Jersey’s
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