Case 1:25-cv-02152-ESK-MJS Document 15 Filed 04/18/25 Page 43 of 51 PageID: 164
prohibition on certain sports wagers does not frustrate the purpose of the CEA just because the CFTC has not yet exercised its discretion to do the same. Put differently, New Jersey, constitutionally, has taken one type of event contract off the table for CFTC approval. That does nothing to hinder the objectives of the CEA. Finally, the Sports Wagering Act does not conflict with the CFTC’s Core Principles requiring that designated contract markets provide participants “with impartial access to its markets and services,” 17 C.F.R. § 38.151(b), and “main- tain risk control mechanisms to prevent and reduce the potential risk of price distortions and market disruptions,” id. § 38.255; see PI Br. 21. The Act does not, as Kalshi argues (at 21), “prohibit” event contracts involving sports wagering. Aside from a small subset of wagers, New Jersey law merely requires that enti- ties obtain a license before offering sports wagers. See supra 4–6. It is hard to see how licensure and related requirements would conflict with Kalshi’s obligation to provide “impartial access to its markets and services,” 17 C.F.R. § 38.151(b), and “maintain risk control mechanisms to prevent and reduce the potential risk of price distortions and market disruptions,” id. § 38.255. Nor has Kalshi explained how New Jersey’s prohibition on wagers for college sporting events in New Jersey or involving New Jersey colleges would make it impossible for Kalshi to comply with its obligations under the Core Prin- ciples. 17 C.F.R. §§ 38.151(b), 38.255. All Kalshi users have impartial access to “its markets and services,” id. § 38.151(b); it’s just that New Jersey users cannot partake in two narrow categories of event contracts. Nothing in the Core
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