Case 1:25-cv-02152-ESK-MJS Document 15 Filed 04/18/25 Page 44 of 51 PageID: 165
Principles indicates that all Kalshi users must have identical capabilities once they access the designated contract market, even if it would be illegal under state law. And obviously New Jersey law does nothing to prevent Kalshi from “main- tain[ing] risk control mechanisms to prevent and reduce the potential risk of price distortions and market disruptions.” Id. § 38.255. In any event, although Kalshi claims that New Jersey law is “in consider- able tension with th[ese] principle[s],” PI Br. 21, “[t]he mere fact of ‘tension’ between federal and state law” is “generally not enough to establish an obstacle supporting preemption,” MD Mall Assocs., LLC , 715 F.3d at 495 (citation omit- ted). And while Kalshi claims that, “[d]epending on the CTFC’s interpretation of its Core Principles,” it “could well be” impossible to comply with them, PI Br. 21, “[t]he existence of a hypothetical or potential conflict is insufficient to warrant the pre-emption of the state statute.” See Rice v. Norman Williams Co. , 458 U.S. 654, 659 (1982). Kalshi has failed to establish that New Jersey law stands as an obstacle to the purposes of the CEA. II. The equities confirm that Kalshi is not entitled to the relief it seeks. Because Kalshi is not likely to succeed on the merits, this Court need not reach the remaining preliminary-injunction factors. But Kalshi fails to demon- strate irreparable harm and the balance of the equities weighs in the State’s favor. A. Kalshi has not established irreparable harm. Even if it could succeed on the merits, Kalshi cannot demonstrate that it “specifically and personally risks irreparable harm” without an injunction. Ad- ams v. Freedom Forge Corp. , 204 F.3d 475, 487 (3d Cir. 2000). Such harm cannot
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