Case 1:25-cv-02152-ESK-MJS Document 15 Filed 04/18/25 Page 47 of 51 PageID: 168
accept those hypothetical wagers is speculative. See, e.g. , Acierno , 40 F.3d at 655 (“possibility of a remote future injury” is insufficient); Omnistone Corp. v. Cuomo , 485 F. Supp. 3d 365, 367 (E.D.N.Y. 2020) (“[P]laintiffs’ demonstration of irrep- arable harm must be considered in conjunction with the time frame involved.”). Nor does Kalshi’s alleged “regulatory risk” of jeopardizing its status as a CFTC-designated contract market amount to irreparable harm. PI Br. 24. For one, as noted, Kalshi would not have to terminate the vast majority of its sports wagers in New Jersey if it obtained the required authorization under New Jersey law. And for the small subset of college sporting events for which it would have to cease accepting offers, Kalshi has not shown that such “regulatory risk” to its CFTC-designation is imminent or non-speculative. Kalshi can continue offering event contracts across the country as long as it complies with applicable laws. Kalshi’s claimed injury from the “technological challenges and costs” of “[a]ttempting to implement geolocation capabilities” to “geolocate its users on a state-by-state basis,” PI Br. 22–23, is also insufficient. Alleged economic injury stemming from compliance with government regulation is not irreparable harm. See A.O. Smith Corp. v. FTC , 530 F.2d 515, 527 (3d Cir. 1976) (“[a]ny time a corporation complies with a government regulation that requires corporation action, it spends money and loses profits,” but “proof of such an injury, alone,” cannot “satisfy the requisite for a preliminary injunction”); Freedom Holdings, Inc. v. Spitzer , 408 F.3d 112, 115 (2d Cir. 2005) (“However, ordinary compliance costs are typically insufficient to constitute irreparable harm.”); Am. Hosp. Ass’n
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