Case: 25-7504, 01/16/2026, DktEntry: 38.1, Page 32 of 47
does not alter IGRA.” Id. at 968. That observation follows from the text of UIGEA itself, which, again, makes clear that UIGEA does not “alter[], limit[], or extend[] any Federal . . . law . . . prohibiting, permitting, or regulating gambling within the United States.” 31 U.S.C. § 5361(b) (em- phasis added). At bottom, “UIGEA prevents using the internet to circumvent ex- isting . . . federal gambling laws.” Iipay , 898 F.3d at 965. It thus cannot be the means of circumventing those laws, which is how Kalshi tries to use the statute. B. The scope of UIGEA’s exception for certain CEA-re- lated transactions is immaterial. Under 31 U.S.C. § 5362(1)(E)(ii), UIGEA does not reach “any transaction conducted on or subject to the rules of a registered entity or exempt board of trade under the Commodity Exchange Act.” Because UIGEA does not supplant IGRA’s prohibitions in the first place, see su- pra , at 21-24, this Court need not and should not decide the scope of this exception. Still, because Kalshi has fixated on this issue—and because the district court expounded upon it, see 1-ER-11-13—a brief elucidation of the context is warranted. As noted, UIGEA prohibits the facilitation of payments associated
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