Case: 25-7504, 01/16/2026, DktEntry: 38.1, Page 34 of 47
law.” In other words, sports wagers may not be listed on CFTC ex- changes at all. Kalshi cites no precedent, anywhere, suggesting that a company can evade UIGEA enforcement by impermissibly listing sports wagers on a CFTC exchange. That is unsurprising: nobody ever tried such a maneuver until Kalshi did last year. Again, the Court need not address Kalshi’s argument on this score. How, if at all, UIGEA’s exemption for CEA-related transactions applies in these unusual circumstances should be addressed only when a claim under that statute has been brought. See Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Forest Serv. , 925 F.3d 1041, 1047 (9th Cir. 2019) (explaining that “[t]he rule against advisory opinions” is “the oldest and most consistent thread in the federal law of justiciability”). III. The CEA does not excuse Kalshi’s IGRA violation. Because UIGEA is not relevant to this case, Kalshi’s only remain- ing argument is that the CEA shields it from liability under IGRA. Ac- cording to Kalshi, sports wagers offered on its CFTC-registered contract market are “swaps” within the meaning of the CEA—and, as such, they fall within the CFTC’s “exclusive jurisdiction” and are exempt from fed- eral, state, or tribal gaming regulations. 7 U.S.C. § 2(a)(1); see supra , at
26
Made with FlippingBook - Online catalogs