Case: 25-7504, 01/16/2026, DktEntry: 38.1, Page 35 of 47
12-13. But that argument misreads isolated statutory phrases, ignores the surrounding sections of the CEA (and all other relevant provisions of the U.S. Code), and requires the Court to indulge an utterly implau- sible conclusion: that Congress silently legalized sports wagering—a long-regulated and oft-prohibited activity—when it passed Dodd-Frank in 2010. Properly construed, the CEA does not apply to Kalshi’s offer- ings—and it certainly does not impliedly repeal IGRA’s regulation of sports wagering on Indian lands. A. Kalshi’s interpretation conflicts with the text and structure of the CEA and related statutes. Kalshi’s arguments about the CEA turn on the meaning of the stat- utory term “swap,” which the CEA defines, in relevant part, as a pay- ment contract “that is dependent on the occurrence, nonoccurrence, or the extent of the occurrence of an event or contingency associated with a potential financial, economic, or commercial consequence.” 7 U.S.C. § 1a(47)(A)(ii). According to Kalshi, wagers on its platform satisfy both elements of that definition, because (1) they turn “on the occurrence, nonoccurrence, or the extent of the occurrence of an event or contin- gency,” and (2) the relevant event or contingency is “associated with a potential financial, economic or commercial consequence.”
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