Case: 25-7504, 01/16/2026, DktEntry: 38.1, Page 37 of 47
can conceive of happening is an event or contingency, and if every down- stream economic consequence someone can conjure up makes that event or contingency associated with a potential financial, commercial, or eco- nomic consequence,” then a single one of those alternative definitions— the one found in subsection (a)(ii)—“render[s] [the rest] superfluous.” Hendrick , 2025 WL 3286282, at *9; accord N. Am. Derivatives Exch , 2025 WL 2916151, at *9. A review of surrounding CEA provisions further undermines Kalshi’s interpretation. See, e.g. , Murphy v. Smith , 583 U.S. 220, 226 (2018) (construing statutory language in light of “the larger statutory scheme surrounding the specific language” at issue). Kalshi contends that its sports wagers are a particular type of swap known as an “event contract.” See D. Ct. Doc. 44, at 9-10. But the CEA authorizes the CFTC to bar the marketing of event contracts that involve “gaming” or “unlaw- ful” activity—and the CFTC has done just that. See 7 U.S.C. § 7a- 2(c)(5)(C)(i)-(ii); 17 C.F.R. § 40.11(a). In other words, both the statute and its implementing regulation treat gaming as a red flag—not an ac- tivity that Congress implicitly licensed. The language of other statutes poses a problem for Kalshi’s reading,
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