Case: 25-7504, 01/16/2026, DktEntry: 38.1, Page 42 of 47
Tribes) in an area where Congress expressly has recognized that author- ity. See 25 U.S.C. § 2701(5). Second, Kalshi’s interpretation violates the presumption against repeals by implication. Under settled precedent, the CEA cannot be read to repeal any part of IGRA “unless the intention of the legislature to repeal is clear and manifest.” Shoshone-Bannock Tribes v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior , 153 F.4th 748, 759 (9th Cir. 2025) (brackets and quotation marks omitted); see Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis , 584 U.S. 497, 510 (2018) (“Congress will specifically address preexisting law when it wishes to suspend its normal operations in a later statute.” (quotation marks omit- ted)). No such “clear and manifest” intent can be drawn from the 2010 Dodd-Frank Act; again, that act did not address the sports wagering or Indian gaming. Had it done so, the text of the bill—not to mention the legislative record and public response—would have looked quite differ- ent. See Martin , 793 F. Supp. 3d at 683. The CEA, even as amended by Dodd-Frank, is the statute that ad- dresses financial instruments that “manag[e] and assum[e] price risks, discover[] prices, or disseminat[e] pricing information through trading.” 7 U.S.C. § 5(a). IGRA is the statute that governs gaming on Indian
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