Case: 1:25-cv-15406 Document #: 43-1 Filed: 01/30/26 Page 7 of 17 PageID #:373
Kentucky Derby, and Masters Golf Tournament. These types of contracts would not serve any real commercial purpose. Rather, they would be used solely for gambling.”). C. Coinbase’s Theory Does Not Meet the Standard for Implied Repeals. Coinbase’s preemption argument must be rejected because it would manufacture an implied repeal of IGRA where none exists. Coinbase cannot meet the heavy burden of proving Congress intended to repeal IGRA because there is a reasonable interpretation that gives full effect to both statutes: the CEA’s definition of “swap”—and thus the CFTC’s jurisdiction over such transactions—simply does not extend to Coinbase’s sports bets. This Court and others apply the “strong presumption that repeals by implication are disfavored and that Congress will specifically address preexisting law when it wishes to suspend its normal operations in a later statute.” Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis , 584 U.S. 497, 510 (2018) (citation modified); United States v. Ill. Pollution Control Bd. , 17 F.Supp.2d 800, 803 (N.D. Ill. 1998); Cook Cnty. v. MidCon Corp. , 773 F.2d 892, 905 (7th Cir. 1985). Congress’s intent to repeal must be “clear and manifest.” Epic Sys. , 584 U.S. at 510 (quoting Morton v. Mancari , 417 U.S. 535, 551 (1974)). “Congress does not alter the fundamental details of a regulatory scheme in vague terms or ancillary provisions—it does not, one might say, hide elephants in mouseholes.” Id. at 515 (citation modified). Here, IGRA and the CEA can easily be harmonized by reading the CEA to exclude sports betting, consistent with longstanding CFTC regulations. 1. Coinbase’s sports-betting contracts are not “swaps.” As relevant here, the CEA defines “swaps” as “any agreement, contract, or transaction … that is dependent on the occurrence, nonoccurrence, or the extent of the occurrence of an event or contingency associated with a potential financial, economic, or
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