Case 3:25-cv-02016-VDO Document 56-1 Filed 01/16/26 Page 21 of 29
to reverse the federal policy that, at the time, prohibited sports betting into a nationwide authorization under the sole jurisdiction of the CFTC. 9 Whether Congress did so is a major question. Under the Major Questions Doctrine, courts have “‘reason to hesitate before concluding that Congress’ meant to confer” agency authority in cases where the agency has asserted a “breadth” of authority over matters of “economic and political significance.” West Virginia v. EPA , 597 U.S. 697, 721 (2022) (internal quotation marks omitted). In such cases, considering “both separation of powers principles and a practical understanding of legislative intent,” there must be “clear congressional authorization.” Id. at 723 (internal quotation marks omitted). Further, “Congress [does not] typically use oblique or elliptical language to empower an agency to make a ‘radical or fundamental change’ to a statutory scheme.” Id. (quoting MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. Am. Telephone & Telegraph Co. , 512 U.S. 218, 229 (1994)). In effect, Kalshi contends that the 2010 CEA amendments displaced state and tribal gaming regulations, nullified all tribal-state gaming compacts, legalized sports betting nationwide, and placed sports betting under the exclusive regulatory jurisdiction of the CFTC, all at a time when federal law broadly prohibited sports betting. This is unquestionably a “radical” and “fundamental” overhaul to both PASPA and IGRA, and certainly raises concerns of “economic and political significance.” This Court therefore has significant “reason to hesitate”
9 Kalshi’s sports-betting contracts also violate other federal laws, including the Wire Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1084, the Illegal Gambling Business Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1955, and the Travel Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1952(a). If Congress authorized sports betting via the CEA in 2010, then it also effectively limited the scope of these federal laws, in addition to PASPA.
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