Case: 25-7187, 02/17/2026, DktEntry: 37.2, Page 16 of 41
form of gambling. See, e.g., Irwin v. Williar , 110 U.S. 499, 508-09 (1884) (describing futures contracts as “nothing more than a wager”); see also Cothran v. Ellis , 16 N.E. 646, 647 (Ill. 1888) (describing futures as “gambling in grain”); s ee also Rumsey v. Berry , 65 Me. 570, 574 (Me. 1876) (finding futures contracts to be void as contrary to public policy). For example, an Arkansas law declared that “[t]he buying or selling or otherwise dealing in what is known as futures . . . with a view to profit, is hereby declared to be gambling” and made dealing in futures illegal. See William W. Mansfield, A Digest of the Statutes of Arkansas § 1848 (U.M. Rose ed., 1884). Nevertheless, the Supreme Court and Congress acknowledged that futures markets served a valuable economic function and should be given room to develop. A futures contract’s “value [is] well known as a means of avoiding or mitigating catastrophes, equalizing prices and providing for periods of want.” Bd. of Trade of Chi. , 198 U.S. 236 at 247-48. 3 And Congress ultimately centralized the oversight and regulation of futures trading on federally regulated contract markets. The first federal legislation designed to create a comprehensive federal regulatory framework for futures markets was the Future Trading Act of 1921, Pub. L. No.
3 Even after the Supreme Court recognized the legitimacy of futures trading on organized exchanges, states continued to characterize commodity futures markets as illegal gambling. See John V. Rainbolt II, Regulating the Grain Gambler and His Successors , 6 Hofstra L. Rev. 1, 6 (1977).
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